Prospect theory is currently the main descriptive theory of decision under uncertainty. It generalizes expected utility by introducing nonlinear decision weighting and loss aversion. A difficulty in the study of multiattribute utility under prospect theory is to determine when an attribute yields a gain or a loss. One possibility, which has been adopted in the existing theoretical literature on multiattribute utility under prospect theory, is to assume that a decision maker views the complete outcome as a gain or a loss. In this holistic approach, decision weighting and loss aversion are general and attribute-independent. Another possibility, more common in the empirical literature, is to assume that a decision maker has a reference point for each attribute. We give preference foundations for this segregated approach in which decision weighting and loss aversion are attribute-specific.
Introduction
Many decision situations involve outcomes that consist of several attributes. In applied decision analyses it is useful to decompose the utility function over these multiattribute outcomes into separate utility functions over the different attributes so as to reduce the number of preference elicitations. Such decompositions are only justified if the decision maker's preferences satisfy particular assumptions. Several authors have identified the preference conditions that allow decompositions of multiattribute utility functions into additive, multiplicative, and related decompositions (e.g. Farquhar 1975 , Fishburn 1965 , Keeney and Raiffa 1976 .
Most of these decomposition results have been derived under expected utility.
Abundant evidence exists, however, that expected utility is not valid as a descriptive theory of decision under uncertainty. The descriptive deficiencies of expected utility complicate the empirical assessment of the preference conditions underlying decompositions: it cannot be excluded that observed violations of preference conditions are due to violations of expected utility rather than to violations of a decomposition. To obtain robust tests of the appropriateness of decompositions, it is desirable to derive conditions that are valid even when expected utility is violated.
In this paper we study multiattribute utility theory under prospect theory Tversky 1979, Tversky and Kahneman 1992) . Prospect theory is currently the most influential theory of decision under uncertainty. It characterizes two major deviations from expected utility: nonlinear decision weighting and loss aversion, i.e. the tendency for people to treat outcomes as deviations from a reference point and be more sensitive to losses than to gains of the same magnitude. Both nonlinear decision weighting and loss aversion are widely documented in the empirical literature. Fishburn (1984) , Miyamoto (1988) , Dyckerhoff (1994) , and Miyamoto and Wakker (1996) studied multiattribute utility under nonexpected utility, but only considered outcomes of the same sign. Like us, Zank (2001) and Bleichrodt and Miyamoto (2003) studied multiattribute utility theory under prospect theory but their approach was different than the approach of this paper as we will explain next.
A central issue in multi-attribute prospect theory is to determine when an attribute yields a gain or a loss. Consider, for example, a researcher who considers changing jobs.
In evaluating different jobs the researcher has to consider several aspects, e.g. salary, commuting time, cost of living, amount of research time, etc. How does the researcher determine whether a particular job offer is an improvement (a gain) compared with his reference point (presumably his current job)? One possibility is that a decision maker first determines whether the job offer as a whole is a gain or a loss compared to his reference point and then applies the decomposition to determine exactly how attractive the job offer is as compared with other offers. This holistic approach was used by Zank (2001) and by Bleichrodt and Miyamoto (2003) .
Another approach, which is the focus of this paper, is that the researcher determines a reference point for each attribute and evaluates job offers as gains and losses on each attribute. This segregated approach seems plausible when the number of attributes is large and the choice is complex. A decision context where the segregated approach is particularly intuitive is welfare theory: there we are interested in whether each individual's welfare is above some reference level. The segregated approach is common in empirical studies on loss aversion for tradeoffs under certainty and was found to be descriptively accurate (Bateman et al. 1997 , Bleichrodt and Pinto 2002 , Tversky and Kahneman 1991 . For the more common case of uncertainty it has not been analyzed, however. Providing such an analysis is the topic of this paper.
The difference between the holistic and the segregate approach is that in the former loss aversion and decision weighting are attribute-independent, whereas in the latter they depend on the attributes. As we will show in Section 5, the holistic and the segregated approach are in general equivalent only when people behave according to expected utility, i.e. when loss aversion does not affect people's preferences and there is no decision weight-
ing. An example to further clarify the difference between the holistic and the segregated approach to multiattribute utility theory is in Section 3. This paper gives preference foundations for additive utility under prospect theory and the segregated approach. We restrict our attention to the additive decomposition for two reasons. First, it is commonly applied in many areas of economics and decision analysis and, second, other decompositions, such as the multiplicative and the multilinear decompositions raise special problems under the segregated approach. Solving these problems requires different tools and is beyond the scope of the present paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives notation and explains prospect theory for single-attribute outcomes. We then move to multiattribute utility where we first assume, for ease of exposition, that there are just two attributes, which are both numerical. Section 4 gives preference foundations for prospect theory with additive utility under the segregated approach. As mentioned, weighting functions are defined per attribute and they may differ across attributes in the segregated approach. To force them to be equal across attributes requires additional conditions. We will characterize this special case in Section 5. We extend our results to the case where there are more than two attributes in Section 6 and to the case of nonnumeric outcomes in Section 7. Section 8 concludes the paper with some observations on the empirical measurement of additive utility in prospect theory under the segregated approach. All proofs are in the appendix.
Prospect Theory for Single-attribute Outcomes
We consider a decision maker in a situation where there is a finite number, n ≥ 2 of distinct states of nature, exactly one of which obtains. S = {1, ..., n} denotes the set of states of nature. Subsets of S are called events. In a medical decision problem, the states of nature can, for example, be mutually exclusive diseases and the decision maker has to choose between different treatments before knowing what the actual disease is. We consider decision under uncertainty where the probabilities for the states of nature may, but need not be given. The assumption of a finite number of states of nature is made for expositional purposes. The results of this paper can be extended to an infinite state space using tools from Wakker (1993) . The extension to decision under risk, i.e. the case where probabilities are objectively given, is as in Köbberling and Wakker (2003, Section 5.3) .
The decision maker's problem is to choose between prospects. Each prospect is an n-tuple of outcomes, one for each state of nature. Formally, a prospect is a function from the set of states of nature to the set of outcomes C. We denote the set of prospects as P = C n . We shall write (f 1 , ..., f n ) for the prospect f that gives f j if state j occurs. A constant prospect gives the same outcome for each state of nature. For ease of exposition, we assume in this section that outcomes are one-dimensional. The set of outcomes C is a nondegenerate convex subset of IR. Outcomes are defined with respect to a reference point. The reference point is a constant prospect, that we will denote as r. We assume that the reference point is fixed, i.e. we restrict attention to preferences with respect to one reference point. Variations in the reference point are analyzed by Schmidt (2003) .
Let < denote a preference relation on the set of prospects. As usual, Â denotes the asymmetric part of < (strict preference) and ∼ denotes the symmetric part of < (indifference), and 4 and ≺ denote reversed preferences. We shall use the same notation for the binary relations on C derived through constant prospects. An outcome x Â r is a gain and an outcome x ≺ r is a loss.
A prospect f is rank-ordered if f 1 < · · · < f n . For each prospect, there exists a permutation ρ such that f ρ(1) < · · · < f ρ(n) . For each permutation ρ let P ρ = {f ∈ P :
That is, P ρ is the set of all prospects that are rank-ordered by ρ. If two prospects can be rank-ordered by a common ρ, then they are comonotonic. For each event A ⊂ S, the set P A contains those prospects that yield gains for states in A and no gains for states not in A. We define the set P A ρ as the intersection of P A and P ρ . Subsets of sets P A ρ are sign-comonotonic.
if V can be replaced by U if and only if U = σV for positive σ. A weighting function or capacity W is a function on 2 S such that W (∅) = 0, W (S) = 1, and for any two events A
Prospect theory holds if there exists a utility function U : C → IR with U(r) = 0 such that prospects f ∈ P A ρ with A = {ρ(1), ..., ρ(k)} for some k ≤ n are evaluated by
with π + ρ(j) = W + (ρ(1), ..., ρ(j)) − W + (ρ(1), ..., ρ(j − 1)) (2a) and π − ρ(i) = W − (ρ(j), ..., ρ(n)) − W − (ρ(j + 1), ..., ρ(n)),
and choices and preferences correspond with this evaluation. P T (f ) denotes the prospect theory value, or PT value for short, of f , and W + and W − are weighting functions for gains and losses, respectively. We will assume throughout that U is strictly increasing, i.e.
for all x, y ∈ C, x > y iff U (x) > U(y), and continuous. If prospect theory holds then utility is a ratio scale and the weighting functions are uniquely determined.
Prospect Theory for Two-attribute Outcomes
From now on C = C 1 × C 2 is a product of two nondegenerate convex subsets of IR. Hence, we now deal with two product structures: the two-dimensional structure of C and the n-dimensional structure C n . In what follows, the index i will refer to the attributes and the index j to the states of nature. Hence, f ji denotes the i-th attribute of the outcome that is obtained under state j. Outcomes in C will be denoted as x = (x 1 , x 2 ) or as x 1 x 2 for short.
Let P 1 denote the set of prospects on C n 1 and P 2 the set of prospects on C n 2 . For a fixed f 2 ∈ P 2 , we define a preference relation < 1 on P 1 by f 1 < 1 g 1 iff f 1 f 2 < g 1 f 2 . We will in Section 4 impose a condition that implies that the choice of f 2 is immaterial. By restricting attention to constant prospects in P 1 , we can define a preference relation < 1 on C 1 . In a similar fashion we can define < 2 on P 2 and on C 2 .
where U i is a real-valued function on C i , i = 1, 2. The functions U 1 and U 2 are joint ratio scales if U 1 and U 2 can be replaced by V 1 and V 2 if and only if V i = σU i , σ > 0. That is, any common change in unit is allowed.
In the holistic approach, any outcome x that is indifferent to r can also be interpreted as a reference point. Hence, it does not make sense to consider gains or losses on any separate dimension in the holistic approach. What matters in the holistic approach is whether an outcome x is a gain or a loss compared to r (i.e., whether x Â r or x ≺ r, respectively).
Under the holistic approach, additive decomposability means that a prospect f ∈ P A ρ with A = {ρ(1), ..., ρ(k)} for some k ≤ n is evaluated as
where the decision weights are defined as in Eqs. (2a) and (2b). The uniqueness results of prospect theory apply, which implies that the attribute utility functions are joint ratio scales and the weighting function is unique. There is only one permutation function that applies to both attributes. In this representation, the decision weight that is assigned to a single-attribute utility function U i , i = 1, 2, depends on whether the entire outcome is a gain or a loss. If an outcome x is a gain then the decision weight π + is applied, if it is a loss then π − is applied. Preference foundations for Eq. (3) were given by Zank (2001) and Bleichrodt and Miyamoto (2003) .
The segregated approach evaluates for each attribute separately whether it yields a gain or a loss, i.e. the segregated approach interprets reference-dependence for each attribute separately. We will denote the reference point on the first attribute by r 1 and the reference point on the second attribute by r 2 . x 1 ∈ C 1 is a gain if x 1 Â 1 r 1 and a loss if x 1 ≺ 1 r 1 and
x 2 ∈ C 2 is a gain if x 2 Â 2 r 2 and a loss if x 2 ≺ 2 r 2 . We will assume that preferences are monotonic in each attribute. Then, in contrast with the holistic approach, the reference point will be unique. We further assume that r 1 is an interior point of C 1 and that r 2 is an interior point of C 2 . This ensures that C 1 and C 2 both contain outcomes that are gains and outcomes that are losses and that genuine tradeoffs between gains and losses exist for both attributes.
For each prospect f , there exist permutations ρ 1 and ρ 2 such that f ρ 1 (1)1 < · · · < f ρ 1 (n)1
the set of all prospects for which the first attribute is rank-ordered by ρ 1 . P ρ 2 is defined similarly. For each event A 1 ⊂ S, the set P A 1 contains those prospects that yield gains on the first attribute for states in A 1 and no gains on the first attribute for states not in A 1 . Similarly, P A 2 contains those prospects that yield gains on the second attribute for states in A 2 and no gains on the second attribute for states not in A 2 . We define
and preferences and choices correspond with this evaluation. The functions U 1 and U 2 are strictly increasing and continuous and satisfy U 1 (r 1 ) = U 2 (r 2 ) = 0. π + ·1 and π − ·1 are the decision weights for gains and losses for the first attribute, π + ·2 and π − ·2 are the decision weights for gains and losses for the second attribute, W + 1 and W − 1 are the weighting functions for gains and losses for the first attribute, and W + 2 and W − 2 are the weighting functions for gains and losses for the second attribute. The utility functions are joint ratio scales and the attribute weighting functions are unique. A comparison between Eqs. (3) and (4) reveals that the holistic approach and the segregated approach differ both in loss aversion and in decision weighting.
An example may clarify the difference between the holistic and the segregated approach to additive utility. Suppose that a researcher considers a job offer from a university that will take effect in some months time. in the holistic approach and in the segregate approach the researcher's reference point for annual earnings is $50K and for research time is 20 hours per week. In the holistic approach,
where we determine first the sign of an outcome and then apply the decompositions, we assume that the researcher's utility function for gains is u(x 1 x 2 ) − u(r 1 r 2 ) and his utility function for losses is λ( u(x 1 x 2 ) − u(r 1 r 2 )) where λ is a coefficient reflecting loss aversion and u is a basic utility function which expresses the researcher's attitude towards outcomes and which is reference independent Kahneman 1991, Köbberling and Wakker 2005) . In the segregate approach, where first the decomposition is applied and then it is determined whether attributes yield gains or losses, the utility for gains is
We assume that the holistic basic utility is
The researcher does not care about other job aspects than wage rate and available research time. If event 1 is "no better candidate is found in the meantime" and event 2
is "a better candidate is found in the meantime" then, according to the holistic approach (Eq. (3)), the PT value of this job offer is equal to
and according to the segregated approach (Eq. (4)), it is equal to
A comparison between Eqs. (6) and (7) shows that both decision weighting and loss aversion differ between the two approaches. While loss aversion and decision weighting are common for single attributes in the holistic approach, they may differ in the segregated approach. First, we may have different decision weighting for the single attributes when the rank-order of outcomes is not identical for both attributes. Second, even if the rank-order is identical, loss aversion and decision weighting may differ as the segregated approach, in general, allows for different degrees of loss aversion and different weighting functions for the single attributes. The possibility of attribute-dependent weighting functions can be realistic in applications. Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) showed that decision weighting depends on the outcome domain with people deviating more from expected utility for affect-rich outcomes. In Section 5, we will characterize the special case of the segregated approach where the weighting functions are the same across different attributes. There is no empirical evidence to conclude that loss aversion differs across different attributes, but intuitively this seems to make sense.
Preference Foundations
This section develops preference conditions for additive prospect theory under the segregated approach, i.e. Eq. (4). We continue to assume that C = C 1 × C 2 with C 1 and C 2 nondegenerate convex subsets of IR. The preference relation < on the set of prospects P is a weak order if it is complete (for all prospects f, g, f < g or g < f ) and transitive.
Any prospect f ∈ P yields both a prospect f 1 ∈ P 1 and a prospect f 2 ∈ P 2 and, hence, each prospect f may be viewed as an element of the product P 1 ×P 2 . Hence, we can denote prospects as f 1 f 2 . Weak separability holds when for all f 1 , g 1 ∈ P 1 and for all f 2 , g 2 ∈ P 2 , f 1 f 2 < g 1 f 2 iff f 1 g 2 < g 1 g 2 and when for all f 1 , g 1 ∈ P 1 and for all f 2 , g 2 ∈ P 2 , f 1 f 2 < f 1 g 2
iff g 1 f 2 < g 1 g 2 . Weak separability entails that the relations < 1 on P 1 and < 2 on P 2 are well-defined. Outcome monotonicity holds if for i = 1, 2, f ji ≥ g ji for all j implies f i < i g i with strict preference holding if one of the antecedent inequalities is strict. Continuity
that is, x j f i is the prospect f i with f ji replaced by x. Let a, b, c, d ∈ C 1 . We write ab ∼ * 1 cd if (i) there exist f 1 , g 1 ∈ P 1 and f 2 ∈ P 2 and a state j such that
where a j f 1 , b j g 1 , c j f 1 , and d j g 1 are sign-comonotonic on C 1 ,
where a 1 f 1 , b 1 f 1 , c 1 f 1 , and d 1 f 1 are rank-ordered prospects in P 1 and v 1 f 2 , and w 1 f 2 are rank-ordered prospects in P 2 .
In the first two indifferences the prospect on the second attribute is kept fixed, in the final two indifferences everything outside state of nature 1 is kept fixed. The ∼ * 1 relationship may be interpreted as measuring strength of preference. For example, from the indifferences (a j f 1 , f 2 ) ∼ (b j g 1 , f 2 ) and (c j f 1 , f 2 ) ∼ (d j g 1 , f 2 ), we can see that ab ∼ * 1 cd means that, in the presence of f 2 , a tradeoff of a for b is an equally good improvement as a tradeoff of c for d: both exactly offset receiving f 1 instead of g 1 for all other states of nature.
A similar interpretation can be assigned to the indifferences (
. Even though the ∼ * 1 relations have a natural interpretation in terms of strength of preference, they are defined entirely in terms of observed indifferences and no new primitives beyond observed choice are assumed in their definition. Hence, we stay entirely within the revealed preference paradigm when using the ∼ * 1 relations.
Let w, x, y, z ∈ C 2 . We define wx ∼ * 2 yz if (i) there exist f 2 , g 2 ∈ P 2 and f 1 ∈ P 1 and a state j such that
where w j f 2 , x j g 2 , y j f 2 , and z j g 2 are sign-comonotonic on C 2 , or (ii) there exist a, b ∈ C 1 and f 2 ∈ P 2 such that
where w 1 f 2 , x 1 f 2 , y 1 f 2 , and z 1 f 2 are rank-ordered prospects in P 2 and a 1 f 1 , and b 1 f 1 are rank-ordered prospects in P 1 .
We say that < satisfies tradeoff consistencyon C 1 if improving the first attribute of an outcome in any ∼ * 1 relationship breaks that relationship. That is, if ab ∼ * 1 cd and a 0 Â 1 a then it cannot be that a 0 b ∼ * 1 cd . Loosely speaking, tradeoff consistency on C 1 ensures that the ∼ * 1 relationship is well-behaved when interpreted as a strength of preference relationship. If the strength of preference of a over b is equal to the strength of preference of c over d, then the strength of preference of a 0 over b cannot be equal to the strength of preference of c over d, when a 0 is strictly better than a.
Similarly, < satisfies tradeoff consistency on C 2 if improving the second attribute of an outcome in any ∼ * 2 relationship breaks that relationship. That is, if wx ∼ * 2 yz and y 0 Â 2 y then it cannot be that wx ∼ * 2 y 0 z. Tradeoff consistency holds if tradeoff consistency holds both on C 1 and on C 2 . An important advantage of tradeoff consistency as a preference condition is that it is closely related to measurements of utility by the tradeoff method (Wakker and Deneffe 1996) . This makes it easy to test tradeoff consistency empirically.
Empirical studies that have used the tradeoff method include Abdellaoui (2000), Etchart-Vincent (2004) , Schunk and Betsch (2006) , and Abdellaoui, Barrios and Wakker (2007) amongst others.
Solvability holds if for any two prospects f, g ∈ P there exists outcomes α and β such that (α 1 f 1 , f 2 ) ∼ g and (f 1 , β 1 f 2 ) ∼ g. Solvability implies that the attribute utility functions U 1 and U 2 are unbounded.
The next theorem characterizes Eq. (4).
Theorem 1 The following two statements are equivalent:
(i) < is represented by the functional in Eq.(4) with strictly increasing weighting functions W + 1 , W − 1 , W + 2 , and W − 2 and continuous, strictly increasing utility functions U 1 and U 2 .
(ii) < satisfies (1) weak ordering, (2) continuity, (3) weak separability, (4) outcome monotonicity, (5) solvability, and (6) tradeoff consistency.
The uniqueness results of prospect theory apply, that is, the weighting functions W + i and W − i , i = 1, 2, are uniquely determined, and the utility functions U 1 and U 2 are joint ratio scales. ¤
Common Weighting Functions
In the segregated approach the weighting functions may differ across the two attributes. In some cases, however, it might be reasonable to take the weighting functions as independent of the attributes. Empirical evidence suggests, for example, that decision weights for money and for health are close (Abdellaoui 2000 compared with Bleichrodt and Pinto 2000) . Using common weighting functions facilitates the use of prospect theory in practical applications, because fewer elicitations are required. In this section we will give a preference foundation for the special case of Eq. (4) where the weighting functions do not depend on the attributes.
By continuity and connectedness of C 1 and C 2 , there exist gains x 1 ∈ C 1 and x 2 ∈ C 2 and losses y 1 ∈ C 1 and y 2 ∈ C 2 such that (x 1 , r 2 ) ∼ (r 1 , x 2 ) and (y 1 , r 2 ) ∼ (r 1 , y 2 ) and, hence, such that U 1 (x 1 ) = U 2 (x 2 ) and U 1 (y 1 ) = U 2 (y 2 ). Recall that r is the constant prospect that gives (r 1 , r 2 ) in every state of nature. For any event B, let x B f denote the prospect f with f j replaced by x for all j in B. We can now define a condition that ensures attribute independence of the weighting functions for gains and for losses. We say that < satisfies attribute-independence for states, if for all x 1 ∈ C 1 and x 2 ∈ C 2 for which (x 1 , r 2 ) ∼ (r 1 , x 2 ) and for all events B, (x 1 , r 2 ) B r ∼ (r 1 , x 2 ) B r. Note that the condition holds for all x 1 ∈ C 1 and x 2 ∈ C 2 , but x 1 and x 2 must be either both gains or both losses for otherwise the indifference (x 1 , r 2 ) ∼ (r 1 , x 2 ) cannot obtain.
Let us now explain the idea behind the condition. As mentioned before, if (x 1 , r 2 ) ∼ (r 1 , x 2 ) then U 1 (x 1 ) = U 2 (x 2 ). If Eq. (4) holds and x 1 and x 2 are both gains, the indif- 
¤
If ρ 1 = ρ 2 and A 1 = A 2 then Theorem 2 also implies that the decision weights π + and π − are attribute-independent. This follows straightforwardly from the definition of the decision weights, Eqs. (5a) and (5b). Having the weighting functions independent of the attributes does not make the segregated approach equal to the holistic approach. This is easily seen by referring back to the example of the researcher considering a job offer.
Under the segregated approach with common weighting functions, Eq. (7) becomes
which clearly differs from the evaluation under the holistic approach, Eq.(6).
Note that it is not only the presence of the loss aversion parameter which distinguishes the holistic from the segregated approach. In general, the two approaches differ even if a prospect yields only gains or only losses. Consider again the job offer example but suppose now that the researcher's reference point for annual earnings is $30K and for research time it is 10 hours per week. The preference (60K, 15h) Â (40K, 30h) still holds. Let E 1 denote the first event and E 2 the second event. Then the job offer is evaluated under the holistic approach as W + (E 1 )((u 1 (60) + u 2 (15)) − (u 1 (30) + u 2 (10)) +
(1 − W + (E 1 )((u 1 (40) + u 2 (15)) − (u 1 (30) + u 2 (10)) and under the segregated approach as W + (E 1 )(u 1 (60) − u 1 (30)) + (1 − W + (E 2 ))(u 2 (15) − u 2 (10)) +
(1 − W + (E 1 )(u 1 (40) − u 1 (30)) + W + (E 2 )(u 2 (30) − u 2 (10)).
Equality only holds if W + (E 1 ) = (1 − W + (E 2 )), i.e., if W + (E 1 ) + W + (E 2 ) = 1. This must hold for all events E 1 and E 2 , which can only be the case if W + is a probability measure. A similar argument can be used to derive that W − must be a probability measure.
Hence, for outcomes of the same sign the prospect theory model with attribute independent weighting under the segregated approach agrees with the prospect theory model of the holistic approach only in the case when both representations reduce to subjective expected utility.
More than Two Attributes
We will now extend our results to more than two attributes. Let C = C 1 × ... × C m , m > 2. Each C i is a nondegenerate convex subset of IR. The reference point on the i-th attribute is denoted r i and is assumed to be an interior point of C i . We will denote the set of prospects on C n i as P i and write prospects as f 1 ...f m . Let g i f denote the prospect f ∈ P with f i replaced by g i and let g i h k f denote the prospect f ∈ P with f i replaced by g i and f k replaced by h k . Weak separability is now defined as for all i ∈ {1, ..., m},
The definitions of outcome monotonicity and solvability easily generalize to the case of more than two attributes. For tradeoff consistency we define
where a j f i , b j g i , c j f i , and d j g i are sign-comonotonic on C i , or (ii) there exist v, w ∈ C k , and f ∈ P such that
where a 1 f i , b 1 f i , c 1 f i , and d 1 f i are rank-ordered prospects in P i and v 1 f k , and w 1 f k are rank-ordered prospects in P k .
Tradeoff consistency holds if each ∼ * i -relationship satisfies tradeoff consistency on C i .
We are now in a position to extend Theorem 1 to the case of more than two attributes.
Theorem 3 The following two statements are equivalent:
where the V i are prospect theory functionals with strictly increasing weighting functions W + i and W − i and continuous, strictly increasing utility functions U i .
The uniqueness results of prospect theory apply, that is, the weighting functions W + i and W − i are uniquely determined, and the utility functions U i are joint ratio scales.
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Attribute independence can easily be extended to the case of more than two attributes, so that the arguments preceding Theorem 2 can still be used to ensure that the weighting functions are attribute-independent.
General Outcomes
For ease of exposition, we have assumed thus far that all attributes are numerical. In many real-world decisions, this assumption is too restrictive. An example is health, the area in which decision analysis is most frequently applied (Keller and Kleinmuntz 1998, Smith and von Winterfeldt 2004) . Health consists of two dimensions, survival duration and health quality, and health quality is a nonnumeric attribute. The extension of our analysis to nonnumeric attributes is straightforward.
Assume that the C i are connected topological spaces. C = C 1 × ... × C m is endowed with the product topology and so is C n . The reference points r i are in the interior of C i for each i. Redefine outcome monotonicity as for all i, if f ji < g ji for all j then f i < i g i . The strict version of outcome monotonicity is not necessary here as it follows from the version with weak preferences and tradeoff consistency (Köbberling and Wakker 2003, Lemma 26) .
We can now state the extension of our results to nonnumeric attributes.
Corollary 4 If the C i , i = 1, ..., m, are connected topological spaces, then Theorems 1, and 3 still hold if we drop in (i) the requirement that the attribute-wise utility functions are strictly increasing. ¤
The proof of this claim follows easily from the proofs of Theorems 1 and 3. Theorem 2 can still be used to ensure that the weighting functions are attribute-independent.
Empirical Measurement
Let us finally say a few words about the empirical implementability of additive prospect theory under the segregated approach. The first step is obviously the verification of the preference conditions that have been identified in this paper. When these are satisfied the prospect theory functional must be assessed for each attribute, unless attributeindependence for states holds because in that case the weighting functions need to be assessed only once. Simultaneous measurement of the utility for gains and losses is difficult. A procedure to achieve this was proposed by Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and Paraschiv (2007) . Their method requires, however, that an "ethically neutral event" exists, i.e. an event that has decision weight 0.5. Hence, we need to impose some richness on the state space to be able to apply this method. When the state space is not sufficiently rich, the method of Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, and l'Haridon (forthcoming) can be used. This method assumes that the utility functions are power functions.
Measurement of the weighting functions W + i and W − i , i ∈ {1, ..., m}, can be done either by non choice-based method like in Tversky and Fox (1995) , Fox and Tversky (1998) , Wu and Gonzalez (1999) and Kilka and Weber (2001) or by choice-based methods as in Abdellaoui, Vossmann, and Weber (2005) .
That is, f + 1 is the positive part of f 1 and f − 1 is its negative part. In a similar fashion we define f + 2 and f − 2 . Consider < 1 on P 1 . Because < satisfies outcome monotonicity and C 1 is nondegenerate, all states of nature are nonnull (a state is null if replacing any outcomes in that state does not affect the preference). Also, because r 1 lies in the interior of C 1 , < 1 is truly mixed (< 1 is truly mixed if there exists a prospect f 1 such that f + 1 Â r 1 and f + 1 ≺ r 1 , that is, genuine tradeoffs between gains and losses occur). By Theorem 12 in Köbberling and Wakker (2003) there exists a prospect theory representation for < 1 with U 1 the continuous utility function over C 1 , U 1 (r 1 ) = 0, and W + 1 and W − 1 the weighting functions over gains and losses on the first attribute, respectively. Köbberling and Wakker's (2003) weak monotonicity follows from outcome monotonicity and sign-comonotonic tradeoff consistency follows from tradeoff consistency on C 1 . By Proposition 8.2 in Wakker and Tversky (1993) , gain-loss consistency can be dropped from Köbberling and Wakker's (2003) conditions when the number of states of nature exceeds 2. This is the case in our analysis if we interpret attributes as events (Sarin and Wakker 1998, Corollary B.3) . U 1 is strictly increasing because V 1 is strictly increasing. W + 1 and W − 1 are strictly monotone by outcome monotonicity. By Observation 13 in Köbberling and Wakker (2003) U 1 is a ratio scale and W + 1 and W − 1 are unique. By solvability, U 1 is unbounded.
By a similar line of argument there exists a prospect theory representation for < 2 with U 2 the continuous and strictly increasing utility function on C 2 , U 2 (r 2 ) = 0, U 2 a ratio scale and W + 2 and W − 2 the unique and strictly increasing weighting functions over gains and losses on the second attribute, respectively. By solvability, U 2 is unbounded.
So far we have shown that V (P T 1 (f 1 ), P T 2 (f 2 )) represents <. It remains to show that V is additive. We will do so by showing that the rate of trade-off between P T 1 and P T 2 is everywhere constant. Take f 1 ∈ P 1 , and let f 2 be a rank-ordered prospect in P 2 . Take α 1 0 ∈ C 2 such that α 1 0 < f 22 . Then (α 1 0 ) 1 f 2 is a rank-ordered prospect in P 2 .
Let g 2 be such that f 2j < g 2j for all j with at least one of these preferences strict. By solvability there exists an outcome α 1 1 such that (f 1 , (α 1 0 ) 1 f 2 ) ∼ (f 1 , (α 1 1 ) 1 g 2 ). By outcome monotonicity α 1 1 Â 2 α 1 0 . Next we consider the prospect (f 1 , (α 1 1 ) 1 f 2 ). By solvability we can find an outcome α 1 2 such that (f 1 , (α 1 1 ) 1 f 2 ) ∼ (f 1 , (α 1 2 ) 1 g 2 ). Hence, α 1 2 α 1 1 ∼ * 2 α 1 1 α 1 0 .
We proceed in this manner to construct a standard sequence α 1 0 , α 1 1 , . . . on the second attribute for which α 1 s α 1 s−1 ∼ * 2 α 1 1 α 1 0 for all natural s. It is easily verified that this implies
Next we construct a standard sequence β 1 0 , β 1 1 , . . . on the first attribute by eliciting
. . , such that all prospects involved are rank-ordered. These indifferences imply that β 1 t β 1 t−1 ∼ * 1 β 1 1 β 1 0 for all natural t and, thus that P T 1 ((β 1 t ) 1 f 1 ) − P T 1 ((β 1 t−1 ) 1 f 1 ) = P T 1 ((β 1 1 ) 1 f 1 ) − P T 1 ((β 1 0 ) 1 f 1 ). The indifferences also define a rate of trade-off between P T 1 and P T 2 . Let P T 1 ((β 1 1 ) 1 f 1 ) − P T 1 ((β 1 0 ) 1 f 1 ) = c. Then the rate of trade-off between P T 1 and P T 2 is constant for all the points we have elicited thus far. This claim follows from trade-off consistency. By trade-off consistency, we must have ((β 1 1 ) 1 f 1 , (α 1 s−1 ) 1 f 2 ) ∼ ((β 1 0 ) 1 f 1 , (α 1 s ) 1 f 2 ) for any s = 1, 2, . . . .
Applying trade-off consistency again implies that we must have ((β 1
for any s = 1, 2, . . . ; t = 1, 2, . . . . Hence the rate of trade-off between P T 1 and P T 2 is everywhere c.
Next we double the density of the grid {β 1 0 , β 1 1 , . . . } × {α 1 0 , α 1 1 , . . . } that we constructed above. By continuity of U 2 and connectedness of C 2 we can find an outcome α 
Hence, the rate of trade-off between P T 1 and P T 2 is still constant when we double the density of the grid.
We continue this doubling of density infinitely, creating increasingly fine standard sequences α 2 −m 0 , α 2 −m 1 , . . . and β 2 −m 0 , β 2 −m 1 , . . . , m = 2, . . . . On the resulting increasingly fine grids the rate of trade-off between P T 1 and P T 2 remains constant by a similar proof as for the case where the density of the grid was doubled.
Because U 1 and U 2 are unbounded, for any natural m there can be no x 1 ∈ C 1 and no x 2 ∈ C 2 such that x 1 Â β 2 −m t for all t or x 2 Â α 2 −m s for all s . There can also be no outcomes infinitely close to β 1 0 and α 1 0 in the sense that there is always an outcome from the grid that lies between an outcome x 1 ∈ C 1 and β 1 0 and an outcome from the grid that lies between an outcome x 2 ∈ C 2 and α 1 0 when x 1 is unequal to β 1 0 and x 2 is unequal to α 1 0 . If x 2 6 = α 1 0 then U 2 (x 2 ) − U 2 (α 1 0 ) = r > 0 and, hence, there exists a natural number m such that 2 −m < r. By construction there is an element α 2 −m 1 of the grid such that α 1 0 ≺ α 2 −m 1 ≺ x 2 . A similar argument shows that the grid interferes everywhere. Let x 2 and y 2 be two outcomes such that x 2 Â y 2 . Suppose that U 2 (x 2 ) − U 2 (y 2 ) = r > 0. Then there exists a natural number m such that 2 −m < r and by construction there is an element α 2 −m s of the grid such that y 2 ≺ α 2 −m s ≺ x 2 .
Finally, because U 1 and U 2 are unbounded there cannot be elements x 1 and x 2 that are so bad that they are never included in any grid. Consider an outcome x 2 . Then we can construct a prospect f 2 with f 2j = x 2 for all j. Because U 2 is unbounded we can construct a prospect g 2 such that f 2j Â g 2j for all j. Let α 1 0 = x 2 and construct a new grid by eliciting indifferences (f 1 , (α 1 0 ) 1 f 2 ) ∼ (f 1 , (α 1 1 ) 1 g 2 ),(f 1 , (α 1 1 ) 1 f 2 ) ∼ (f 1 , (α 1 2 ) 1 g 2 ) etc. This produces a dense grid that includes x 2 .
By continuity we can extend the dense grid to all outcomes. Hence, we have shown that on the whole domain the rate of trade-off between P T 1 and P T 2 is constant for rankordered prospects. Hence, for rank-ordered prospects V (P T 1 (f 1 ), P T 2 (f 2 )) is additive:
V (f ) = P T 1 (f 1 ) + P T 2 (f 2 ). Because U 1 and U 2 are continuos and unbounded and C 1 and C 2 are connected we can for any prospects f 1 and f 2 find rank-ordered prospects g 1 and g 2 such that f 1 ∼ 1 g 1 and f 2 ∼ 2 g 2 . We set V (P T 1 (f 1 ), P T 2 (f 2 )) = P T 1 (g 1 ) + P T 2 (g 2 ).
Finally, we show that P T 1 (f 1 ) + P T 2 (f 2 ) represents <. Suppose that f < g. There are rank-ordered prospects f 0 and g 0 such that f 0 ∼ f and g 0 ∼ g. By transitivity, f 0 < g 0 .
Hence, P T 1 (f 1 )+P T 2 (f 2 ) = P T 1 (f 0 1 )+P T 2 (f 0 2 ) ≥ P T 1 (g 0 1 )+P T 2 (g 0 2 ) = P T 1 (g 1 )+P T 2 (g 2 ).
which completes the proof of statement (i).
The uniqueness results follow from the uniqueness results for P T 1 and P T 2 combined with the fact that on each grid the rate of tradeoff between P T 1 and P T 2 must be constant.
This completes the proof of Theorem 1. ¤ Proof of Theorem 3: That (i) implies (ii) is routine. Hence, we assume (ii) and derive (i). The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem 1 and will not be elaborated here.
By weak separability V (V 1 (f 1 ), . . . , V m (f m )) with V strictly increasing in each of the V i represents < . We then use the results of Köbberling and Wakker (2003) to show that each V i has a prospect theory representation. Finally, we show, exactly as in the proof of Theorem 1, that for all i, k ∈ {1, ..., m}, the rate of trade-off between any P T i and P T k is constant. This establishes the proof. ¤
